In Washington, yes, if the claim is that the crew drove negligently. On October 29, 2026, the Washington Supreme Court held in Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings, LLC that the state's EMT immunity statute does not protect an ambulance company from a claim that its crew drove negligently. The statute shields emergency medical care, the court said, and driving is not medical care (official opinion, Washington Supreme Court, No. 104498-4).
What happened in Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings?
Frank Costa was a patient being taken by ambulance to a hospital. The Northwest Ambulance crew had secured him on the gurney with guardrails and two lap belts, over his waist and knees, but had not used the shoulder straps. Company policy required the shoulder straps. En route, one EMT thought Mr. Costa's heartbeat was becoming irregular and called an emergency code, which lets a driver use certain privileges, such as exceeding the speed limit, as long as the driver keeps due regard for the safety of others.
The driver, EMT Henry Shaw, came up behind a garbage truck and then sped up to pass it. By his own account, the truck moved back into his lane and he braked hard. He then swerved right toward the shoulder and hit a highway divider head on. Mr. Costa was thrown from the stretcher into the ambulance wall and injured his head, neck, and arm. He died later that day. The company fired both EMTs on the crew, citing in part excessive speed and failure to transport the patient with proper restraints.
The personal representative of Mr. Costa's estate, Michael Lang, sued the ambulance company for wrongful death and for the claims that survive a person's death. The estate also named the garbage truck's operator as a defendant, but that claim was not part of this appeal. The company admitted ordinary negligence in both the driving and the missing shoulder straps, and it admitted causation, but it denied gross negligence. Its defense was that the immunity statute, RCW 18.71.210, shielded it completely. The trial court disagreed and the case went to a jury, which returned a general verdict for the estate. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and so did the Supreme Court. The opinion does not state a dollar amount for the verdict.
Why did the court say the immunity does not cover driving?
The statute protects EMTs and licensed ambulance services from liability for an EMT's good-faith acts or omissions while rendering emergency medical service under medical supervision. Subsection (2) limits that to "the actual emergency medical procedures," not acts outside the EMT's field of medical expertise (RCW 18.71.210). The majority gave several reasons for reading it that way.
The law defines emergency medical service as "medical treatment and care" that may be given at the scene or while transporting a patient. In the court's reading, "while transporting" says when care may be given, and the act of driving is not itself treatment.
State regulations tie "emergency medical procedures" to the skills in an EMT's certified scope of practice. Driving an ambulance is not part of EMT training or certification, and the state sets no driver-training standard. Mr. Shaw testified that his driver training was a classroom slideshow of "maybe an hour or two."
Another law says that when two or more EMTs staff an ambulance, the one who is not driving attends to the patient. The court added that an EMT who is driving cannot also attend to patient care.
A separate statute gives volunteers immunity for both care and transporting people. The court took the different wording to mean the legislature did not extend EMT immunity to transport.
Washington gives no immunity for negligent driving to police officers or firefighters, and the emergency-vehicle statute says its driving privileges do not relieve a driver of the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons. The court called it anomalous to treat ambulance drivers differently.
What did the dissent say?
The vote was 6 to 3. Justice Mungia wrote for the majority. Justice Montoya-Lewis wrote the dissent, joined by Justice Gordon McCloud and Justice Pro Tempore Madsen. She read the definition of emergency medical service, which includes ambulance transportation, to cover the work of driving an ambulance, and she pointed to the classroom and field training Northwest Ambulance gave its new EMTs on driving an ambulance and using its lights and sirens. In her view, the immunity exists so EMTs can act fast in an emergency without fear of being sued over an ordinary mistake. She would also have held that securing a patient is part of rendering emergency medical service, and she would have granted summary judgment to the ambulance company. She noted that the immunity does not cover gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct, so a driver's conduct could still be challenged on that basis. The complaint in this case did not allege gross negligence.
What does the ruling not decide?
The court expressly did not decide whether failing to use all the restraints is covered by the immunity. The company never asked for a special verdict form that would have had the jury separate the driving from the missing straps, so the negligent driving alone was enough to support the verdict.
The ruling also removes a defense without settling who is at fault in any other crash. The majority said ambulance drivers are held to "the ordinary standard of care for emergency vehicle drivers." The company here admitted negligence and causation, so the opinion does not address how a family proves them when a company contests them. The plaintiff was the patient's estate, and the opinion does not discuss a suit by another motorist.
The majority also said the immunity does reach an EMT's rendering of medical services during transport. A claim that an EMT was ordinarily negligent in treating the patient can still be barred, then, if the treatment was in good faith and within the EMT's medical expertise. The statute adds that the protection does not apply to an act or omission that is gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct (RCW 18.71.210(5)). The defendant here was a licensed ambulance company, and no government service was a party. The statute lists government units among the parties it protects (RCW 18.71.210(1)(g)), and its limit to actual emergency medical procedures applies to the whole section (RCW 18.71.210(2)), but the court did not decide a case against one. The dissent warned that the ruling puts rural emergency care "in real peril."
Does this apply outside Washington?
No. The decision interprets a Washington statute and binds Washington courts only. It does not discuss any other state's law, so it does not tell you how an ambulance claim would work elsewhere.
What can a patient or family do after an ambulance crash?
Apart from the claim-filing statute in the last step, these steps are general practice and do not come from the opinion.
Ask for the crash report from the police agency that responded, and write down the report number at the scene if you can.
Find out who operated the ambulance. The company name is usually on the bill, and the patient care report often lists the crew. Ask for a copy of the patient's records, including that report.
Note how the patient was strapped in and what each family member saw or heard. In Mr. Costa's case, the company's own restraint policy and its admissions about the crew's negligence were part of the record.
Photograph injuries and the vehicle, and keep every medical record and bill together.
Find out whether the ambulance service is a private company or run by a city, county, or fire protection district. A claim against a local government must be presented on a tort claim form within the time allowed for suing, and a lawsuit cannot start until 60 days after that (RCW 4.96.020).
Where can you read the sources?
The opinion, including the dissent, is on the Washington courts site, and the immunity statute is in the Revised Code of Washington. Time limits and procedures for injury and death claims are set by state law, so check the official sources for your own situation. This page summarizes one decision and is not a guide to every ambulance claim.
Frequently asked questions
Can you sue an ambulance company in Washington for negligent driving?
The Washington Supreme Court held in Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings (October 29, 2026) that the EMT immunity statute, RCW 18.71.210, does not protect an ambulance service from a claim of negligent driving. The court said driving is not emergency medical treatment, so the immunity does not apply to it.
Are EMTs still immune for medical care decisions?
Generally, yes. The majority said the immunity covers acts done in good faith while giving medical services, including during transport, so a claim of ordinary negligence in treatment can still be barred. The statute does not apply to gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct (RCW 18.71.210(5)).
Did the court decide whether skipping shoulder restraints is covered by immunity?
No. The court said it did not reach that question because the company never asked for a special verdict form separating the driving from the restraint failure, and the negligent driving alone supported the verdict. The dissent would have found that securing a patient is covered.
Does this ruling apply in other states?
No. The holding rests on the wording of a Washington statute, and the opinion does not discuss any other state's law.
What did the dissent argue?
Justice Montoya-Lewis, writing for the three dissenters in a 6-3 decision, argued that the law defines emergency medical service to include ambulance transportation and that driving code takes training within an EMT's field. In her view, the immunity exists so EMTs can act quickly in emergencies without fear of liability for ordinary mistakes.
This article is general legal information, not legal advice, and may not reflect the most current law or the law in your jurisdiction. Laws vary by state and change over time. For advice about your specific situation, consult a licensed attorney.
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